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Abstract:  
It is a truism to state that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a 
politicized issue, yet the explanations that account for this politicization are mostly singular in 
nature. In this paper I add to this understanding theoretically and empirically by presenting a 
broad analytic framework that puts TTIP at the intersection of two evolutions. There is, firstly, 
a longer-term trend of increasing political authority of (European) trade policy that is (at least 
by several organizations and citizens) not considered legitimate. I argue that TTIP is an 
extension and an intensification of this perceived authority-without-legitimacy trend. 
Secondly, the particular explosive situation that has occurred since 2013 is furthermore the 
result of a specific combination of a favoring political opportunity structure, combined with 
pre-existing mobilization resources that have facilitated a large mobilization by civil society 
organizations. This explains the spike of politicization that is attached onto this longer term 
trend. Relying on several exploratory interviews, I try to uncover the determinants in the 
different categories. 
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1 – Introduction 
Since the 1990s, a rising trend in European politics is that elites increasingly have to look over 
their shoulder when negotiating European issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This is part of a 
broader evolution in international politics since the 1980s, signifying that the gap between the 
elite game of international relations and the contested domestic sphere is becoming 
increasingly blurred (Schmidtke, 2014). Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) argue that 
this ‘politicization’ is a process in which “progressively more societal actors pay attention to 
and reflect on the political order beyond national borders” (cursive added). In this sense, world 
politics has apparently reached a “reflexive moment” whereby societal and political actors are 
increasingly becoming aware that international institutions have can have a decisive impact 
on our lives (Zürn, 2004). Especially concerning the European Union, much effort in the past 
few years has gone into furthering this literature on politicization of European integration, 
which has focused both on the politicization of ‘Europe’ itself (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Green‐
Pedersen, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2007), or on specific domains, 
such as the eurocrisis (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015; Leupold, 2015; Statham & Trenz, 2015), 
tax governance (Schmidtke, 2015) or consumer policy (Rauh, 2013).  
Nowhere is this evolution towards more contestation and debate about the use of 
supranational institutions or issues more visible than in the case of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), a free trade agreement under negotiation between the US and 
the EU. Debates about this in essence very technical trade and investment issue are regular 
media items in several countries and frequently discussed in the ‘European bubble’. 
Mobilization from civil society organizations (CSOs), trade unions and citizen movements is 
large and growing, and even the general public is increasingly aware and engaging with these 
trade issues that were some years ago seen as – above all – dull. Many of these expressions 
form part and parcel of a general process of ‘politicization’: an increase in polarization of opinions, 
interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy 
formulation within the EU” (De Wilde, 2011, p. 566). 
Explanations for this politicization of TTIP frequently focus on singular arguments, such as 
anti-American feelings, the stir that the Vattenfall ISDS case caused, or a general revolt against 
the European Union. Without downplaying the relevance of these statements, a broader and 
integrated approach to explain the politicization of TTIP is needed. In this paper, therefore, I 
use and further insights from the politicization literature to add to this explanatory 
understanding.  
The theoretical part of this paper consists of two parts. Firstly, the (adapted) framework here 
explains politicization, manifested as mobilization by civil society organizations and citizens. This 
conceptualization of the dependent variable follows the argument made by Zürn (2015) that 
too much emphasis in measuring politicization has been on analyzing mass media, as 
reflective of the ‘public sphere’. With the specific example of (European) trade policy, I show 
that this approach could here indeed miss important aspects. Secondly, the resulting 
explanatory framework combines (i) a longer-term trend of the politicization of (EU) trade 
policy, mainly determined by increasing political authority with or without the required 
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legitimacy; and (ii) the spike of mobilization around TTIP consisting of a combination of a 
particular political opportunity structure and (pre-existing) mobilization resources possessed 
by civil society organizations. This politicized spike or episode adds fuel to a longer-term trend 
of the politicization of trade. With insights from the main literature and several exploratory 
interviews with activists or CSO representatives, I elaborate on different aspects of this 
framework.   
2 – Theoretical framework 
Politicization research to date1 has followed a trajectory from (i) understanding and getting to 
grips with the fact that “something like politicization [of the EU] has happened since the mid-
1980s” (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Schmitter, 2009), (ii) defining and conceptualizing the 
phenomenon and process (see e.g. (De Wilde, 2011; De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2015), 
(iii) explaining what its causes are (De Wilde et al., 2015; Rixen & Zangl, 2013; Schmidtke, 2014; 
Zürn et al., 2012) and (iv) looking into the causal consequences and normative implications 
(De Wilde & Lord, 2015; Rauh, 2013; Zürn, 2014). In this framework, I focus on step 2 and 3. 
2.1 The run-up: different elements, different manifestations 
 
As Zürn (2015) remarks, politicization has mainly been studied as a discursive phenomenon, 
measured predominantly through mass media (content) analysis (Hutter & Grande, 2014; 
Statham & Trenz, 2013), parliamentary debates (Wonka, 2015) or laypeople’s discourse 
(Hurrelmann, Gora, & Wagner, 2015; Hurrelmann & Schneider, 2014). Indeed, many authors 
conceptualize and define it this way. De Wilde (2011) sees politicization equated with 
intensifying debates among an increasing amount of groups or people, located within the public 
sphere (through media, parliaments or ‘on the streets’). In the words of Rixen and Zangl (2013): 
“Politicization is present if collectively binding decisions increasingly become the subject of 
controversial public debates” (p. 365). Others have also argued that politicization is best dealt 
with as a discursive phenomenon, that must become salient in political communication 
(Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hurrelman & Schneider, 2014). The main operational elements used to 
study the phenomenon in the public sphere (mostly through mass media analysis) are: salience 
(is it often mentioned?), polarization (do different opinions exist?) and actor expansion (are there 
many contributors to the debate?) (De Wilde et al., 2015). 
If politicization would only/mainly manifest itself in the public sphere (studied through media 
or in parliament), trade policy can show long periods of non-politicization. Arguably, 
contentious and important episodes have surely been present, but as trade policy generally 
involves technical issues (and for the EU, embroiled in the complex multi-level EU structure) 
it does not lend itself to common public interest, making it hard for trade to make the media’s 
                                                          
1 The politicization literature reviewed here focuses on the societal politicization of the European Union 
(or international institutions in general), which deals with the narrowing divide between international 
relations and civil society/public. Public administration scholars see politicization as the opposite of 
bureaucratization or expert rule (see e.g. Wille (2012)). This could be defined as institutional 
politicization. De Wilde (2011) provides a framework that could integrate both interpretations. Many 
thanks to Pieter De Wilde himself for providing these insights.  
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agenda (Beyers & Kerremans, 2007). Equally, national parliaments have often been reluctant 
to spend much time on trade policy issues, seeing the greater public was not really interested2.  
What is more, European trade policy has been actively de-politicized in various ways, in the 
sense that it has been taken away as much as possible from debates in the public sphere. Since 
the Treaty of Rome (1956), the idea has always been to insulate trade policy from (special) 
interest groups (known as collusive delegation, cfr. Dur (2008)) with the explicit goal to 
preserve a liberally oriented (free) trade policy. This is wat Flinders and Buller (2006) refer to 
when recognizing formal principal-agent relations as an institutional de-politicization tactic 
(p. 5). The same logic could be seen on international level in the 1990’s with the 
institutionalization of several (neoliberal) frameworks (such as NAFTA, WTO, EU Single 
Market) into legal and quasi-legal agreements, actually “insulating these policies from day-to-
day democratic debate and decision-making (Dierckx, 2012), a process widely known as the 
“new constitutionalism of neoliberalism” (Gill, 1995). 
A more subtle de-politicization tactic is the reliance on the discursive claim that free trade or 
globalization is irreversible or the natural state of things (Hay & Rosamond, 2002); Van 
Apeldoorn (2003) in Dierckx (2015)) or that trade debates are “purely technical” (see Rixen 
(2009)). This has strengthened the idea that there is no alternative (TINA) to globalization or the 
free flow of trade/capital (Dierckx, 2015)3. More generally, this de-politicization tactic can be 
described as “the invocation of preference-shaping through recourse to ideological or rhetorical claims 
in order to justify a political position that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond the scope 
of politics or the capacity for state control” (Flinders & Büller, 2005, p. 10). In an opinion piece4, 
Trade Commissioner Malmström (2015) made the case for TTIP as being a “no-brainer” to 
reach much-needed jobs and growth; as if this is an issue we should not even consider 
debating. These tactics seem to suggest that these issues are “off the table”, and that we don’t 
even have the possibility of making collectively binding decisions on this matter, as this is the 
natural state of things and it is beneficial for everyone. Through these de-politicization tactics 
(consciously or not), trade policy has an even smaller chance of making it to public spheres 
such as parliaments, the media or laypeople’s discourse. 
Not making these agendas, and therefore not being picked up by politicization research, does 
not imply that trade (or any issue) is any less political (Zürn, 2015)5. Trade may be de-
                                                          
2 The president of the Foreign Affairs committee in the Belgian federal Parliament said, for example, 
that trade agreements were simply rubber-stamped for years, mainly relying on what their European 
colleagues were saying (Debate on TTIP in Ghent, 2015). 
3 This kind of belief, if widespread in popular or political consciousness, can be extremely resilient, even 
if it faces crisis or contradicting empirical evidence about its fundamental claims (Flinders & Büller, 
2005, p. 11). (Orbie & De Ville, 2011) show, for example, that the neoliberal trade policy trend of the 
European Commission has not only survived the financial and eurocrisis, but has – through subtle 
discursive changes – been branded as part of the solution, instead of the problem, to get out of these 
difficulties. 
4 “Don’t believe the anti-TTIP hype – increasing trade is a no-brainer”, via 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/16/ttip-transatlantic-trade-deal-businesses  
5 According to Zürn (2015), the root of this insuffiency in current research, lies in two different 
conceptions of “the political”. He distinguishes between the political being, firstly, bound by public debates 
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politicized (or non-politicized) in the sense that it does not make the public sphere frequently, 
but it has not lost its inherently political character: protest movements that stay under the 
(media) radar, activity of interest groups through consultations or the writing of position 
papers, changing beliefs (for better or worse) about the benefits of trade deals negotiated by 
the EU, are all manifestations of the same process of politicization, that are hardly reflected in 
the media. They point towards the presumption that trade is political in the sense that it 
constitutes a public good we should be talking about (Zürn, 2015), or the demand that we reflect 
about the policy-making or the policy itself (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). They indicate “an attempt 
to move something into the political sphere that was previously not” (Zürn, 2015, p. 168). Politicizing 
something, according to Buzan (1997) therefore means “to make an issue appear to be open, a 
matter of choice […] in contrast to issues that either could not be different (laws of nature) or should 
not be put under political control”.  
Several authors therefore point out that politicization is manifested in different ways, i.e. types 
of expression in which politicization becomes evident so we are able to research it (Baglioni & 
Hurrelmann, 2015; Zürn, 2015; De Wilde et al., 20156). The different operational elements 
(salience, polarization and actor expansion) could then apply to all three such manifestations. 
Next to the macro level of public debates (where the focus of research has been), there is a meso 
level of political activities or mobilization efforts, that points towards social protest and the 
activities of parties and interest groups related to supranational decision making (Baglioni & 
Hurrelmann, 2015). Thirldy, there is a micro level of changing attitudes and beliefs related to 
the supranational level. In this paper, I want to use this broadened understanding, and focus 
on the meso level of political activities or mobilization. Table 1 summarizes this theoretical 
argument7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
about the right course of handling collective problems (i.e. the discourse-theoretical view of politics à la 
Habermas), and secondly, the ability to make collectively binding decisions (the system-theoretical view 
of politics à la Easton (1965)). 
6 Even though De Wilde et al. (2015) do not speak literally of different manifestations, they do point to 
these different types of expressions when describing the operational elements of politicization.  
7 I acknowledge that when issues or institutions get politicized at macro level, there is a most likely 
chance that this will entail consequences, more than when it is only politicized on micro and/or meso 
level. However, we do need this broader conception, exactly to point to those situations that are not 
politicized on macro level.  
5 
 
 Salience Polarization Actor expansion 
Micro (beliefs) 
Importance relative 
to other issues or 
institutions 
Different beliefs 
about the issue or the 
institution 
Individuals with 
different traits (social 
status, sex, ethnic 
group etc.) see the 
issue or institution as 
important 
Meso (mobilization) 
Importance relative 
to other targets of 
mobilization 
Mobilized groups 
stand for different 
positions 
Many different types 
of groups mobilize 
Macro (public 
debates) 
Often mentioned in 
media (relative to 
other issues) 
Polarization of 
statements/claims 
Expansion of 
contributors to the 
debate 
Table 1. Operational elements and different manifestations of politicization. In grey what is focused on in this paper. 
Source: Zürn (2015) 
2.2 Dependent and independent variables 
 
2.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
My take in this paper is therefore to focus on politicization, manifested as mobilization (or political 
activities) by civil society organizations and citizens:  
an increase of political activities (or the resources spent towards it) by a growing and diverse 
group of [civil society] organizations with different goals, that are related to supranational 
decision-making, in an attempt to affect or influence it8.  
Examples include participation in formal activities at EU level, such as Civil Society Dialogues 
or consultations; writing of position papers towards MEPs (or MPs, with the ultimate attempt 
to influence EU decision-making); (trans)national protest activities, or the resources spent 
towards it (opening up of lobby offices at EU level, personnel hired to follow trade debates, 
investment to develop expertise on an issue), etc. 
As a full operationalization (especially over time) is outside the scope of this paper, I only 
indicate here that TTIP itself is a politicized issue.  
There are many ways in which the salience of TTIP relative to other targets can be indicated. A 
consultation on the contentious ISDS clause, for example, received about 150.000 answers, 
                                                          
8 Note that this does not automatically reflect protest or resistance, but also increased use of the 
supranational level (or international institutions). Cfr. Infra.  
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which is a record-high in Europe9. Another way to show this is by plotting the attendance of 
CSOs in the formal Civil Society Dialogues, held by the European Commission (fig. 1). 
Attendance for TTIP(-related) events (in grey) have an average of about 120 organizations 
present, while similar agreements such as CETA and ACTA barely made it to 30 
organizations.10 
 
Fig. 1. Number of participating organizations in DG TRADE’s Civil Society Dialogues.  
Secondly, the actor base has clearly expanded and now involves more groups than only the 
direct economic stakeholders of trade agreements. Environmental, labor and consumer 
groups; organizations active in North-South or human rights issues; (new) social movements 
directly or indirectly tied to the TTIP issue (some have taken this up while formerly/in parallel 
campaigning on e.g. anti-austerity issues); SMEs and large corporations; academics; 
journalists; critical observers or activists (e.g. the influence of George Monbiot on the debate 
in the UK); municipalities and cities; citizen movements; all of these are engaged in political 
activities to a certain extent.  
Thirdly, these groups all have very different opinions of what should happen with TTIP, which 
certainly makes the debate polarized. Making unavoidable mistakes by abstraction, there is a 
clear divide between the pro-TTIP, business-side and the anti-TTIP civil society camp, which 
has already been labelled a new form of trade politics (Young, 2016). Of course, within these 
two camps, lots of diverging views exist, such as a classic reformist-rejectionist divide in the 
anti-camp (see e.g. the position papers by BEUC (2014) or ETUC (2014) that support TTIP in 
                                                          
9 Consultations on fracking (22.000 replies) and copyright reform (9500 replies and 11.000 questions) are 
clearly outnumbered. 
10 What is striking is that the CSD on the state of play on investment protection (which also included 
ISDS) held in the beginning of 2013 barely sparked any attention among organizations. Only months 
later, when discussions started, for many this went top of the agenda.   
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principle, but with modifications) or the lack of unified ‘business’ positions regarding SMEs 
(see Young, 2016, p. 19).  
2.2.2 Independent variables 
 
Trend 
To explain politicization, political authority above the nation state is seen as the main driving 
force of the politicization of European integration (issues) (Schmidtke, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012; 
Rixen & Zangl, 2012). An international institution is said to have this authority “when states 
recognize, in principle or in practice, their ability to make legally binding decisions on matters relating 
to a state’s domestic jurisdiction, even if those decisions are contrary to a state’s own policies and 
preferences” (Cooper, Hawkins, Jacoby, & Nielson, 2008, p. 505).  This implies the acceptance 
that someone or some institution should be given the authority to make decisions to advance 
the common good (Zürn et al., 2012). De Wilde and Zürn (2012) discern level, scope and 
inclusiveness as central components of this authority. Level means the centralization of 
decision-making powers vis-à-vis Member State governments and the extent to which 
majoritarian decision-making procedures count instead of mere intergovernmental consensus 
(Börzel, 2005; Rixen & Zangl, 2013). Scope refers to the breadth of policy fields in which the 
institution has a say, and to what extent it penetrates in domestic policy-making issues 
(Schmidtke, 2014). Inclusiveness, lastly, refers to the constituencies affected by the EU (different 
countries, but also different types of groups), and the extent to which they (the constituents) 
can affect the EU11. 
With increasing political authority a certain level can be reached where institutions can make 
collectively binding decisions on matters that were previously predominantly domestic 
jurisdiction (Cooper et al., 2008), so-called behind-the-border issues (Woods & Narlikar, 2001; 
Zürn, 2004). As such, EU citizens are more frequently confronted and affected by decisions 
taken on that level, which logically leads to questions about the legitimacy and accountability 
of these institutions (De Wilde, 2011; Smythe & Smith, 2006; Statham & Trenz, 2015). Hence, 
as (trade) issues rub against various issues of domestic politics, it becomes politicized 
(Hocking, 2004). This line of research thus expects that there is a longer term trend whereby 
rising political authority and politicization are strongly correlated, a finding that comes back 
in different studies (Schmidtke, 2014; Rixen & Zangl, 2013). 
The intensity or the form that politicization ultimately takes (resistance and protests, or 
increased utilization of the institution) crucially depends on legitimacy (Rauh, 2013; Zürn et 
al., 2012; De Wilde, 2011). According to Zürn et al. (2012) legitimacy is “the acknowledgement of 
the rightful exercise of this authority”, making it conceptually distinct from authority12. Authority 
                                                          
11 Authority differs across institutions along a continuum. At very high levels, one could label it 
“supranational”, as in the case of the EU in several domains (Cooper et al., 2008). 
12 This is not a common conceptualization, as many people actually see authority as “legitimized” 
power. Interestingly, however, making this distinction can be very promising in explaining why TTIP 
is criticized by NGOs and public interest groups (mostly on social, environmental or consumer 
grounds), but also by far-right groups such as the FN by Marine Le Pen. The former dispute the 
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is thus considered legitimate depending on whether the norms, rules and judgments produced 
by it are based on a shared belief of the common good and procedural fairness (ibid.) In the 
following I use the broad definition put forward by Schmidt (2013), as it includes different 
legitimacy elements I will further work with: “the extent to which input politics, throughput 
processes and output policies are acceptable to and accepted by the citizenry, such that citizens believe 
that these are morally authoritative and they therefore voluntarily comply with government acts, even 
when these go against their own interests and desires” (p. 10). 
Output legitimacy refers to the capacity to solve problems, and the likelihood that the outcome 
will be accepted based on its impacts or its effectiveness in upholding community values 
(Smythe & Smith, 2006); in other words, its societal acceptability (Zürn, 2004). Input legitimacy 
refers to the participatory quality of the process that leads to laws and rules and directs our 
attention to elements such as elections, political parties, demonstrations and protests, or the 
voice of interest groups (Scharpf, 1997; Schmidt, 2013). Throughput legitimacy, lastly, is a 
process-oriented question, that focuses attention on the decision-making process as a whole, 
and the intermediation of interest groups in particular. It is about the practices that go on 
inside the ‘black box’ of policy making: transparency, inclusiveness, openness, accountability, 
efficacy (Meunier, 2003, 2005; Schmidt, 2013).  
Applied to trade policy, all the above means that if the rising political authority of EU trade 
policy is not perceived as legitimate (trade does not “deliver” in economic and normative 
terms, and the way trade policy is made, is not perceived as fair, transparent and inclusive) 
this would according to Zürn et al. (2012) lead to politicization taking the form of resistance 
towards EU trade (or towards the EU polity as such13). To the extent that actors do perceive 
this as (potentially) legitimate, it will lead to increased utilization of (and discursive support 
for) the policy14. In figure 2, the box signifying ‘Trend’ plots this part of the framework: the 
link between authority and politicization, is mediated on a longer time frame by throughput 
and output legitimacy.  
                                                          
legitimacy of the exercise (we accept that you can set the rules, but we’re not happy with how you do 
it, nor what you produce), while the latter even dispute this authority transfer in itself (doesn’t matter 
how good you do it, we don’t want the EU doing this for us). 
13 Or, for that matter, resistance towards the EU itself. Mair (2007) claims that the absence of organized 
opposition at EU level has dampened the ‘political’ dimension in several EU domains, which has led to 
direct opposition to the EU polity instead. In TTIP as well, claims against TTIP are often conflated with 
claims against the EU.  
14 There is obviously a large amount of actors that recognize what is or can be achieved through EU 
trade policy for the advancement of common or individual goals (see e.g. the discussion of the EU as a 
power ‘through’ trade, Meunier and Nicolaidis (2006)). 
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Figure 2. Theoretical framework. Own adaptation of Zürn et al. (2012), Rauh (2013), (Zürn, 
2015). 
Spike 
However, this rather abstract and longer term trend does not result in the same politicization 
(be it manifested as public debates, mobilization, or changing beliefs) levels over time; there 
are specific ‘episodes of contention’ (De Wilde, 2011) that fuel this trend. Such specific spikes 
are often centered around crises or specific initiatives, which make it appear top of the 
mobilization, media or parliamentary agenda. A trivial one is that you need ‘something’ to 
mobilize on. If TTIP wasn’t here, for example, maybe none of the mobilization would have 
happened. Others involve having a genuine potential to mobilize, or a favorable context to 
make your voices heard. According to Zürn (2015), the variables accounting for this time-
specific element15 are ‘mobilization resources’ and ‘political opportunity structures’16.  
Translated to a context focusing on the meso level, (pre-existing) ‘mobilization resources’ is 
defined here as all necessary or sufficient elements that facilitate the engagement with 
supranational decisions (own definition), such as the number of organizations operating in a 
certain field, (pre-existing) network linkages between groups, financial resources, or specific 
expertise and discourses. Political opportunity structures (POS) are defined as “consistent – 
but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to 
engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 1989). Two different categories of POS exist: structural 
and signaling variables (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). The first relates to formal changes in rules 
and policies that affect political access and the changed practices that follow from them 
                                                          
15 Note importantly that this also involves location-specific politicization – this is not taken up in this 
paper, but is an integral part of furthering this research project.  
16 I propose to handle them distinctly here, even though they are arguably influenced by each other. 
Mobilization resources can be increased, for example, when a favorable (structural) political 
opportunity structure is present. The other way around, structural changes in the polity can be 
advocated by civil society groups. 
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(Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986 in Meyer (2004)). Signaling variables, secondly, are related to 
the activity and perception of activists themselves, who look for encouragement for 
mobilization in a changing political environment (Tarrow, 1996).  
In sum then, a combination of a specific political opportunity structure and pre-existing 
mobilization resources provide an environment in which a spike of politicization, manifested 
as mobilization, can occur. This is signified by the ‘Spike’ box in figure 2 above. To answer the 
question “Why is TTIP such a politicized issue?” therefore, we need to assess the previous 
elements in light of trade policy. In the following, I decompose authority, legitimacy, POS and 
mobilization resources in this specific case.   
3 – Authority and Legitimacy 
 
3.1 Political authority of trade policy governance 
Trade policy has always been an exclusive competence of the EU vis-à-vis the Member States 
since the Treaty of Rome (1956). Subsequent treaty changes and decisions by the Court of 
Justice have almost always resulted in a spillover of competences, and thus the widening of 
the level and scope of the supranational layer (Devuyst, 2013). In the areas where the EU has 
exclusive competence, decisions can be made with qualified majority voting in the Council. 
Trade authority is therefore a defining characteristic of the EU’s authority in general.  
In terms of scope, the evolution on EU level cannot be seen as disconnected from the 
multilateral level. The 1990s especially were changing times in this respect. Since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay round and the establishment of the WTO (1995), services, 
investment, commercial aspects of IPR, and an increasing amount of behind-the-border tariffs 
(as resembled in TBT and SPS rules) have come onto the trade radar. The EU’s commitment in 
this era lay above all at the multilateral level, but the provisions in the WTO have subsequently 
been the benchmark of efforts at bilateral or regional level as well17. In the years that followed, 
dead-lock at the multilateral forum has spurred the EU (and the US) to engage in more and 
more demanding bilateral agreements (Sbragia, 2010)18. The provisions included in these EU 
FTAs go both further than what could be decided upon in the WTO (WTO-plus provisions) or 
include domains that are not even on the WTO’s agenda (WTO-extra) (Horn, Mavroidis, & 
Sapir, 2009)19. Through trade, the EU is therefore increasingly dealing with issues that were 
exclusively domestic beforehand, which has been coined the ‘new trade politics’ (Young & 
                                                          
17 Using different forums to liberalize goods and services can be seen as an exercise in the “politics of 
scale”. See e.g. Raza (2016). 
18 Which is the main reason why transnational trade protest has first been witnessed towards 
multilateral level (Seattle WTO, or MAI) and later towards EU trade. 
19 It is often argued that what could not be achieved multilaterally, is increasingly pushed through by 
the EU (and the US) bilaterally (Shadlen, 2006). Best example of this trend are the so-called ‘Singapore 
issues’ on investment, public procurement, trade facilitation and competition. These were an absolute 
no-go on the multilateral table for developing countries, but are increasingly becoming standard 
provisions in bilateral FTAs. Trade facilitation, however, is the only Singapore issue where consensus 
was reached in the WTO, at the Bali Ministerial in 2013. 
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Peterson, 2006). The Lisbon Treaty change in 2009 again enhanced the EU’s trade authority 
vis-à-vis the Member States by supranationalizing partly ‘unresolved’ issues such as services 
and IPR (that were still mixed competence before) or investment protection.  
The intrusion of trade rules into domestic policy, combined with the increasing ‘legalization’ 
of trade policy have imposed international constraints on domestic maneuvering space (ibid.)20 
and have increased the political authority of European trade policy. As trade issues touched 
upon various aspects of domestic politics, the issues became more politicized, that is, more 
actors became engaged and conflicted in increasingly salient trade issues. Indeed, a widely 
recognized effect of the change in trade policies, is that an increasing amount of groups feel 
affected and have joined the debate (i.e. increasing inclusiveness). Whereas early tariff 
negotiations were about reciprocal market access and diffuse benefits related to liberalization, 
negotiations on non-trade-barriers (NTBs) in essence deal with measures adopted to secure 
public policy objectives. These are intended to be in the interest of the public21, but can to a 
certain extent be harmful for businesses that are engaged in cross-border trade (Winslett, 2016). 
The distribution of costs is thus different, and subsequent disputes (such as fights over TRIPs, 
dolphin-unfriendly tuna or reformulated gasoline) that were sparked by this trade-off 
triggered the attention of a multitude of environmental, consumer and/or development NGOs 
that are active on these fronts (Young, 2006). Many feared a race-to-the-bottom in the wake of 
competitive deregulation to attract foreign investors (Vogel & Kagan, 2004), but once 
mobilized, these new trade actors often became pro-active later on, seeing trade rules not only 
as a threat, but also as a possible tool for realizing (Young, 2006). This reflects the double 
reaction of on the one hand, groups utilizing the supranational trade authority to their benefit, 
and on the other hand, groups contesting it22.  
To conclude, trade authority (first through the WTO, but overtaken by the EU) has risen in 
level, scope and inclusiveness over the previous decades, which has shifted more and more 
attention to (EU) trade policy, as it increasingly penetrates domains that were previously 
domestic policies. This authority is expected to lead towards increased utilization and 
resistance towards it, which is premised on the existence of legitimacy, or the lack thereof.23  
3.2 Output legitimacy: Is trade really for all? 
International trade has always had and still has the potential to bring many advantages to the 
welfare of individual countries and their citizens. At the same time there is no denying that 
                                                          
20 And arguably also on developing countries (see e.g. Wade, 2003; Chang, 2005).  
21 Or can arguably be protectionist in nature as well. 
22 Von Bülow (2010, p. 198) notes this can even be seen within groups’ discourse: there is an unresolved 
tension between arguments in favor of more global regulation (such as environmental or labor rights), 
and at the same time preserving national sovereignty in other areas, such as investor rights.    
23 Even regarding authority in itself (the acknowledgement that the EU level is functionally and 
necessarily responsible for trade policy), there is already contestation. Member State battles about the 
transfer of sovereignty in this domain are of course the best examples, but a part of nationalist resistance 
against the EU in general is guided by the skepticism about every transfer of competence that reduces 
national sovereignty (cfr. the national backlash view triggered by increasing cultural and economic 
interdependence, Kriesi et al., 2008). 
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trade deals, through lowering tariff barriers or opening markets, have always spurred winners 
and losers. A main challenge of the post-war international economic system has therefore been 
to reap the benefits of trade, while making sure the impact on the losers stays minimal. John 
Ruggie has famously dubbed the specific solution in many Western-European countries to this 
problem ‘embedded liberalism’ (1982): as long as there is some form of protection for the 
“losers”, domestic support for increasing economic openness is provided (Hays, 2009)24. 
Rodrik (1997) has empirically shown that there is indeed a positive relationship between the 
scope of government (especially in social welfare programs) and open economies, related to 
the compensation hypothesis: social safety nets are installed to mitigate income or 
employability drops. 
While it might have been reasonable to claim that increasing trade liberalization in the GATT-
era has brought great advantages to everyone, this has proven difficult to sustain, for several 
reasons. Firstly, this has to do with the fact that many displaced workers, due to free trade 
agreements with low-cost countries, have not found new jobs as easily as was predicted in the 
economic models justifying the signing of those agreements (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2016). 
Moreover, the social safety nets that should catch these workers are waning in many advanced 
economies as well, where pressure from different angles (e.g. budgetary restrictions through 
European economic governance) have made it increasingly difficult to sustain (universal) 
social security coverage25. The globalization paradox or dilemma (Rodrik, 2011)26 points to this 
tension: globalization makes the demand for social safety nets bigger, but at the same time 
undermines a country’s ability to finance additional spending (Hays, 2009). The concern was 
put forward here that this dilemma would either lead politicians to rethink economic 
openness, or to a popular backlash against globalization (ibid.). 
Secondly, the content of trade deals since the mid-90s (both in the WTO and regional/bilateral 
deals) has also raised doubts about this ‘global benefits’ claim (Smythe & Smith, 2006). One of 
the most recurring (popular) claims is that international trade is only to the benefit of business, 
especially large internationally oriented firms – a claim that goes back two decades. The TRIPS 
agreement on intellectual property rights, for example, was seen by many as serving the large 
pharmaceutical multinationals (ibid., p.35). The negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments (MAI) in the mid ‘90s were labelled as a “charter of rights for multinational 
corporations”, or “NAFTA on steroids” (Walter, 2001). Exclusion of investor rights from trade 
agreements was one of the few things that challengers of trade agreements throughout the 
Americas (across very different organizations) could unite on (Von Bülow, 2010, p. 197). One 
of the main claims of the anti-GATS network of campaigners during the Doha round was that 
“the chief beneficiaries of this new GATS regime are a breed of corporate service providers” 
                                                          
24 This was also seen as re-embedding capitalism, which for some had become decoupled or dis-
embedded from society; the term “dis-embedding” has been famously coined by Karl Polanyi in his 
work The Great Transformation (1944). 
25 See Hays (2009) for a good explanation why liberal market economies such as the US and the UK are 
most prone to enjoy a liberalization backlash in the (near) future.  
26 This has been expanded to a trilemma; choose two of the following: globalization, the nation state and 
democracy (Rodrik, 2011). 
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(Crespy, 2014, p. 174). This overarching claim that trade has gone too far and has not been to 
the benefit of everyone, has been around since the ‘90s, and does not seem to withered over 
the years.  
Thirdly, even besides the income effects of trade, many other concerns pop up that seem to 
contradict the “normative beliefs” people have about the outcomes trade should produce. 
Ehrlich (2010) shows that there is a significant amount of people who call themselves ‘fair 
traders’, who express sincere beliefs that trade should be regulated in order to prevent harm 
to the environment or to labor conditions in third countries, without being necessarily against 
trade per se. Several authors have written about the shrinking of policy space for developing 
countries because of the multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements they have gotten into 
(Chang, 2006; Mayer, 2009; Wade, 2003). The many organizations (North-South, 
environmental, labor) that have campaigned or are increasingly campaigning on trade issues, 
recognize these dimensions of trade (both post-materialistic and altruistic) as salient and it 
constitutes their core business. Many of them are fundamentally criticizing the outcome of 
current trade negotiations, the best example of this being the creation of an ‘Alternative Trade 
Mandate’ alliance. This consists of more than 50 organizations that have developed an 
alternative vision of European trade policy that puts people and planet before profit and 
business27. 
These different reasons show that at least the perception of the outcome legitimacy of trade is 
wobbling. A recent study on public opinion in Germany and the US furthermore showed that, 
compared to the numbers in a Pew survey of 2014, the generally positive opinion of trade is 
sharply decreasing (Bluth, 2016).  Rodrik (2016) argues that trade has been a large contributor 
to inequality in advanced economies, claiming that “globalization has not lifted all boats” and 
therefore becoming a culprit for the deprived. The long-standing claim of opponents that trade 
is only for the large and powerful is all but dead. An opinion piece by economist and former 
Secretary of the Treasury in the US, Larry Summers, formulated it sharply:   
“The core of the revolt against global integration, though, is not ignorance. It is a sense, not wholly 
unwarranted, that it is a project carried out by elites for elites with little consideration for the 
interests of ordinary people — who see the globalization agenda as being set by big companies 
playing off one country against another.” (Summers, 2016) 
The above paragraphs provide no exhaustive picture of what European trade policy does or 
does not produce. The argument, however, is that the output legitimacy of trade, i.e. its 
measure of acceptability with regards to efficiency and normative beliefs, has through the last 
two decades been waning across a large amount of groups and citizens. Whereas in the post-
war trade period it was possible to claim that trade benefits all and that sectors or groups could 
be protected, the perception of validity of this claim has withered away and question marks 
have been put next to the ability of trade to serve all.   
                                                          
27 http://www.alternativetrademandate.org/  
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3.3 Throughput legitimacy: “this is how we do” 
Throughput legitimacy considers aspects such as the transparency of the decision-making 
process, how inclusive the process is in terms of consultation or participation, and the 
accountability of decision-makers themselves (Zürn et al., 2012). The more intrusive into 
domestic spheres (and thus authoritative) trade policy has become, the more calls for a fair 
and transparent process have emerged.  
As mentioned, EU trade policy has been designed in such a way that special interest groups 
(or national representatives) do not have the ability to capture the process to their benefit (De 
Bièvre & Dür, 2005). If applied and evaluated in real life, however, the evidence in favor of this 
collusive delegation argument is tenuous at best (Schwartzkopff, 2009). Trade officials at the 
European Commission have always had the necessity of reaching out towards organizations 
for input (called “reverse lobbying”, Woll (2007)), and actors that can provide technical 
expertise have been shown to have the greatest access (Bouwen, 2002). Particularly in trade 
policy, this expertise is predominantly provided by business organizations. Governments 
mainly relied on export-oriented firms that have information on market access in third 
countries, to counter domestic protectionist opposition (Walter, 2001; Dür, 2008). Even when 
the focus of negotiations changed towards regulation, the business-government relations 
changed accordingly (Woll & Artigas, 2007). The result is what Hocking (2004) described as 
the ‘adaptive club model’: a model that recognizes it should reach out to the constituents most 
affected by it, while still keeping the mode of consultation fairly closed.28 As Walter (2001) 
notes: nowhere was the process of government-business consultation very transparent or 
“democratic”. 
The further trade policy intruded domestic domains and public policy spheres, however, the 
bigger the calls were to open up this policy-making system (Winslett, 2016). This was already 
voiced around the mid-90s by CSOs that were actively mobilizing against NAFTA or the MAI 
(Walter, 2001), but the bulk and most significant outbreak hereof was channeled on the WTO. 
In the famous Battle of Seattle (1999), the lack of transparency of this institution, and the almost 
total absence of options to participate in the debate, had come center-stage (Smythe & Smith, 
2006). In the EU as well, trade policy processes were informal and dominated by a ‘relatively 
small expert policy community’ (Woolcock, 2010). According to Meunier (2005) as well, 
resentment in this area got bigger as citizens became increasingly aware that trade decisions 
affect their lives, and because trade is a domain in itself that arouses suspicions of illegitimacy 
because of its collusive delegation, the power of the executive authority and the many trade 
technicalities. These concerns already stood against a background of a perceived democratic 
deficit in the EU, the traditional distorted interest representation in EU trade policy, and the 
Pandora’s box of legitimacy concerns opened up in Seattle (ibid.) 
In the aftermath of the failures of the Seattle Ministerial and the MAI negotiations, a lot of 
thought therefore went into changing the practices of trade policy-making, as governments 
throughout the developed world started to recognize that trade policy could no longer be a 
                                                          
28 Hocking (2004) doubts however if the EU is the best example of the adaptive club model, especially 
in trade, as the amount of formal mechanisms to include business groups is not extensive.  
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technocratic, behind-the-doors, policy, without input from civil society (Hocking, 2004). The 
general solution to this (perceived or real) legitimacy crisis was to open up the procedures, 
both in terms of transparency and participation, to arrive at what Hocking (2004) describes as 
a multi-stakeholder model: a model that includes a broad range of CSOs, in order to enhance 
the consensus in favour of free trade, and to counter the growing opposition to it (Ostry, 2002).. 
The WTO has responded over the years by setting up websites, making access to documents 
as easy as possible, and including benevolent NGOs to a certain extent in the process (Smythe 
& Smith, 2006). For the EU as well, a larger process of opening up Europe (manifested through 
e.g. the White Paper on Governance (2001) or the European Transparency Initiative (2006)) 
included the setting up of so-called Civil Society Dialogues to establish continued working 
relationships with a core group of CSOs (Hocking, 2004). Since then, consultation on EU trade 
policy has fundamentally stayed the same.  
Both in the WTO and the EU, however, the changes have not been perceived as going far 
enough. In the WTO, the changes have been channeled around formal transparency provisions 
(Marceau & Hurley, 2012), while many believe real participation is still – unjustifiably – not 
on the table (Charnovitz, 2003) The CSDs in Europe, although an effort to increase 
participation, have been pejoratively described as ‘policy briefings’ (Hocking, 2004), giving 
NGOs access without influence (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007), and fraught with an insider/outsider 
distinction favoring those NGOs that have adapted to a business-like organizational lobbying 
style (Jarman, 2008). An on-going debate about the question how much transparency and 
consultation is enough still lingers (Hanegraaff, Beyers, & Braun, 2011; Meunier, 2003). 
In sum, the ever-increasing political authority in EU trade policy has been accompanied by a 
long-standing perceived lack of legitimacy, both about how trade policy is made, and 
increasingly about the outcome of this particular free trade regime. Whatever the scope of 
these claims, they persisted through and are strikingly similar across time. TTIP is in itself an 
extension and an intensification of this trend.  
3.4 TTIP – more of the same?  
Although TTIP is a free trade agreement and not a treaty change, it still has a large authority 
potential. Arguably the most important chapter and goal of the negotiations is (horizontal) 
regulatory cooperation, which would entail a shift in the discursive context surrounding 
regulatory decision-making (Bartl, 2015; Siles-Brügge, 2016). This would oblige governments 
preparing laws and regulations, to undergo some sort of Trans-Atlantic screening test, which 
includes “early warning” to the other partner and “stakeholder input and involvement” at any 
level. It is feared that this would put unnecessary high burdens on future laws and regulations 
that are prepared with the goal of protecting consumers, environment or workers, as, for 
example, rules would have to be crafted in the “least trade restrictive way” (BEUC, 2015). The 
political authority increase could therefore be said to exceed even the European level, 
transferring it to a symbolic Trans-Atlantic level, by giving more authority to US authorities 
and foreign companies to engage with the regulatory decision-making process at European 
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and maybe national level29. Likewise, the debate on ISDS is often framed as a corporate power 
grab, in which private firms would have – through private or public tribunals – the chance to 
fight domestic regulations that potentially interfere with their business plan and profit – an 
authority transfer to the corporate world30. 
Furthermore, the “living nature” of the agreement makes this political authority theoretically 
infinite, as both regulatory cooperation and ISDS provisions can potentially be applied to every 
regulation in the future that has an (implicit) trade impact. As such, it directly affects a vast 
amount of people and organizations. As a coordinator of the S2B31 network formulated it very 
well: “Groups get involved in TTIP, not because it is evil as such, but because they care about 
something. They want to see something happening, they want a fair food system, they want 
financial regulation, they want whatever. And then they come to realize that TTIP is actually 
a terrible idea to get what they want as positive reforms” (interview 2). Added to these 
concerns is the specific dynamic inherent to trade negotiations, which involves deadlines and 
compromises, adding a whole new dimension to regulatory cooperation, which has 
historically been based on voluntary agreements (see e.g. Nicolaidis and Shaffer (2005); 
Pelkmans and Correia de Brito (2015))32. 
The output legitimacy of TTIP has also been contested widely. The projected economic benefits 
of the deal are contested on an academic level (Capaldo, 2015), with claims that the models 
showing TTIP’s benefits are an exercise in “managing fictional expectations” (De Ville & Siles-
Brügge, 2014). The most contentious issues, such as ISDS and regulatory cooperation are 
labelled frequently as the prime examples of the “transatlantic corporate bill of rights”, a  
“corporate power grab”, and a threat to democracy (CEO, 2013; Monbiot, 2013); the same 
discourse and language that has been around for decades. The value-critique on trade is 
reflected in De Ville & Siles-Brügge’s (2015) argument about the conflicts surrounding TTIP 
being not distributive, but normative in nature. Opponents are not (primarily and solely) 
contesting the asymmetry of distribution in benefits, but the impact on our standards and 
values, on how we want to shape our society. Questions and concerns relate to a broad range 
of issues, such as food safety, data protection, energy provision, which are fused with 
normative questions of how we should shape (solutions to) these problems. The answer that 
TTIP would provide, is here not perceived as satisfactory, and runs counter to many people’s 
and organizations’ belief of what outcome trade policy should produce. Much in the same way 
that Ruggie (1994) wrote about a new “dis-embedding” of the market from society after the 
                                                          
29 At the time of writing, it was not sure if regulatory cooperation would involve the non-central level 
(Siles-Brügge, 2016) 
30 In both these respects, it is argued that TTIP is an issue driven by a philosophy that idealizes the efficient 
dynamic of the free market and seeks to minimize constraint by democratically elected institutions (De Ville & 
Siles-Brügge, 2015). 
31 The Seattle 2 Brussels Network is a network of organizations that challenge the corporate-driven trade 
agenda of the European Union and European governments. 
32 Pelkmans et al. (2015) conclude that negotiating regulatory cooperation is fundamentally different 
from standard (tariff) trade negotiations, as regulators have to be certain at all times that they can still 
fulfill their primary duty of protecting standards.  
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Uruguay round, does the emergence of TTIP reflect the profound ambition for further dis-
embedding (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015).  
More generally, TTIP is often seen as a crystallization of many other problems people and 
organizations are dealing with, making it an ideal target to channel frustrations. TTIP taps into 
middle class concerns about the nature of globalization and demographic change (Fabry, 
2016). It is seen as a “corporate lobbying paradise” (CEO, 2015) and as such a prime example 
of what is wrong with EU lobbying in general. A representative from the Belgian patient 
organization stated that TTIP would re-open the door towards further privatization of health 
insurances; a debate they thought was settled over the past years (interview 5). So in sum, 
TTIP is a symbolic file for many citizens and organizations who all have their own concerns, 
but see it distilled into this one debate.  
TTIP is also under fire regarding throughput. Transparency concerns and the one-sided 
approach of the Commission of only consulting (big) business organizations, without credibly 
hearing the concerns of CSOs, are the main bones of contention. Hundreds of organizations 
have condemned “the lack of transparency and democratic procedures [which] makes it 
impossible for citizens and civil society to monitor the negotiations in order to ensure that 
public interests are being protected”33. Fighting for transparency is arguably even the one issue 
where every CSO is committed to, with a view on fundamentally changing the trade practice 
on this level. As one interviewee put it: “I hope we can keep pushing on this, [changes in 
transparency and] the structure of trade policy, and that – now that we are with so many people – we 
can change those things that can help us later on as well. We shouldn’t put everything on the content 
of TTIP” (interview 1). The accusations, furthermore, that TTIP is a prime example of the 
distorted interest representation is shown in leaks and reports claiming that about 90% of 
organizations lobbying TTIP were business groups (CEO, 2015).  
To conclude, TTIP crystallizes many of (and is a substantive shift in) the longer term evolutions 
witnessed in EU trade policy: an ever-increasing political authority, which is not considered 
legitimate, neither in terms of output nor in the way it is made. This, in turn, describes the 
‘Trend’-part of the theoretical framework. To explain the explosion of mobilization against 
TTIP, more is needed than just a long term trend, however. The next two parts indicate several 
political opportunity structures and mobilization resources that combined have facilitated 
politicizing TTIP, in terms of mobilization.  
 
 
                                                          
33 http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-
briefings/2015/TTIP%20letter%20and%20signatures%20-%20EN.pdf  
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4 – Political opportunity structures 
While POS can refer to both signaling and structural variables (see 2.2.2), I predominantly 
focus on the former in this part, as this reflects the answers provided by NGO representatives 
during interviews.  
Absence of asymmetric negotiations 
Negotiating with a country like the United States holds a first time possibility that the EU itself 
will need to compromise on substantive issues. In the past, EU trade policy has focused first 
and foremost on ex-colonies and developing countries (Orbie, 2009). The EU, fundamentally a 
large market of 500 million consumers, was in these negotiations always the dominant partner, 
able to influence international affairs through persuasive and coercive means (Damro, 2012). 
This situation hardly triggered concerns among European organizations or citizens that 
Europeans would have to “give in” to reach a deal34. Even after the Global Europe strategy 
kicked off in 2006 and the EU started to negotiate with ASEAN countries, India, Canada and 
South-Korea, it was never expected that these countries would have much leverage in these 
discussions that would hurt the European economy35. As one NGO representative stated: “the 
big difference with TTIP is that people immediately understood that these negotiations will be different 
from all others we had; that the EU is meeting a player here that can change Europe." (interview 1). In 
other words, the symmetry in power relations between the negotiating partners gave TTIP a 
certain salience that was not present in other PTAs (Young, 2016), which has alarmed a variety 
of organizations that see potential harm in these agreements. Moreover, this asymmetry has 
also helped the message come across to a wider public. As one of the coordinators of the Seattle 
2 Brussels Network argued: “to put it very simple, the US scares people, which has been extremely 
useful for our campaign. […] The bad opinion that many people have about US corporations [was there] 
already, so there was not many education to do on this.” (interview 2).  
The emerging clashes in TTIP are also not new. The most famous trade disputes in modern 
history are exactly between the US and the EU: the mad cow disease outbreak in 1996 that led 
to a ban in the EU on hormone beef (BST) and several GMOs; the NSA scandal and the 
subsequent dispute on transferring and handling data; the US-unilaterally reformed Sarbanes-
Oxley act on accounting rules which spurred EU criticism; the entry into force of REACH, a 
broad chemicals-regulating regulation, causing likewise opposition from the US side. These 
concern exactly those topics that are on the table now: financial regulation, data, 
pharmaceuticals, food standards (which are probably the most sensitive topic in the EU, deep-
                                                          
34 Of course many organizations were critical with respect to the impact on developing countries, see 
above. 
35 Occasionally there are sectors fearing that FTAs could lead to a deteriorating European position in the 
world economy, but these calls have been accommodated. For example, In the EU-South Korea FTA, 
concerns were voiced by the European automobile sector (ACEA). A safeguard clause was subsequently 
voted upon by the European Parliament, to mitigate potential negative consequences (Van den Putte et 
al., 2014). 
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rooted in cultural aspects, see e.g. Eliasson, 2015). For NGOs, therefore, it is at least perceived 
that the costs at European side will fall in the areas of regulation36.   
ISDS cases 
Arguably the most toxic element of the deal has been the investor-to-state-dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism. What is in essence a legal, technical and complex arbitration procedure, 
has risen to the top of the agenda for almost every TTIP campaigner; an evolution that was 
unthinkable some years ago (interview 4). As will be elaborated in section V, the expertise on 
ISDS was already present, but hardly anyone was listening to these concerns. In parallel with 
the start of the TTIP negotiations, however, there were several big ISDS cases for the first time 
directed towards European countries. The most famous one is from 2013, when the Swedish 
company Vattenfall sued Germany for its decision to fade out nuclear energy after the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster (Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Hoffmann, 2013)37. This sparked an 
understanding of the mechanism that wouldn’t have existed without the case (interview 1, 4) 
and had in itself outraged the massive anti-nuclear (anti-Atomkraft) movement in Germany, 
who subsequently joined the mobilization against TTIP. This POS is very similar to what we 
have seen in the 90s when protests against the MAI were fueled by the Ethyl vs Canada ISDS-
case, resulting in much more media attention and other groups joining (Walter, 2001).  
In TTIP, the same ISDS provisions were being negotiated in the context of a free trade 
agreement with a country that holds thousands of large multinational companies (and which 
has never lost an ISDS case). This combination of high-profile ISDS cases (that sparked the idea 
that Europe can get hit), together with the absence of asymmetric negotiations (two capital 
exporting countries with major multinationals on both sides, interview 2) has really provided 
an ideal mobilization target. Dierckx (2015) states that other agreements (that hold the same 
investment chapters, like EU-Canada or EU-Singapore), have much less political resonance, 
which makes it more difficult for groups to politicize this agreement (Dierckx, 2015). At the 
time however, no cases against European firms were known, nor did anyone expect that 
Canadian firms would sue European governments.  
Crises everywhere 
Another political context variable that facilitated groups’ mobilization relates to the financial 
and subsequent eurocrisis that rocked Europe and its citizens since 2008. It was already 
mentioned in the part on authority and output legitimacy that many people over the years 
have started to recognize that globalization has not been for everyone. The recent crises and 
their outcomes have only exacerbated this feeling and provided a new outlet to vent 
frustrations, which makes it easier for organizations to build campaigns around these issues. 
Put frankly:  
                                                          
36 The TTIP Leaks of 2 May 2016 have arguably provided a clear insight into the American position, 
which confirms the importance the US attaches to these chapters. 
37 Other cases are e.g. Spain getting sued for its renewable energy policies or Belgium for its 
nationalization of Fortis Bank.  
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“There was a lot of frustration building about this elite, that benefitted from the crisis and were 
winners of that situation. They caused it and then benefitted from it. I think a lot of people 
channeled that frustration and anger to the idea that [in TTIP] you also have an elite group, not 
only of big companies but also of investment lawyers, that were reaping the benefits of this 
system, at the expense of public policies and people's money.” (interview 4) 
In this sense, the financial and eurocrisis have been fertile ground that produced a political 
context where mobilization was effective.  
The role of the European Parliament 
As a structural variable, the strengthened role of the European Parliament after the Lisbon 
Treaty is obviously the most significant change concerning “formal changes in rules and 
policies”. This gave the EP veto power in trade policy, as final agreements have to survive a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote from the House (Van den Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2014). Theoretically, then, 
this adds another lobbying battleground, and could provide additional channels for CSOs (and 
business organizations) to influence the negotiations. As such, the existence of this new role 
may affect the success or failure balancing exercise that groups make when deciding to engage 
on a certain topic, and it could add to the salience of the issue, leading to more citizens and 
groups becoming engaged (Dür & Mateo, 2014). There have already been preliminary accounts 
of this role, pointing towards the EP being receptive and the guardian for groups that are 
vulnerable for trade agreements (Richardson, 2012), generally supporting the EU’s 
liberalization agenda, but susceptible to special protectionist interests (Van den Putte et al., 
2014) and gradually recognizing its renewed power, especially since the landmark move of 
striking down the ACTA agreement in the plenary session (Dür & Mateo, 2014). The 
significance of this new role is therefore a puzzle still needing more explanation. One 
interviewee stated that the EP certainly was an important battleground, especially before the 
TTIP resolution in June 2015, but that the TTIP mobilization as we see it now would probably 
not reflect big differences had the EP not received this veto power (interview 4), so its relevance 
for the amount of mobilization is in dubio.  
5 – Mobilization resources 
Combined with a favorable political opportunity structures, there have to be mobilization 
resources present, i.e. necessary or sufficient elements that facilitate the engagement with 
supranational decisions. This includes variables such as financial resources, breadth of 
constituency, expertise and discourse, or networks and coalitions. In this explorative 
framework, I will only touch upon the latter two: trade coalitions and pre-existing expertise. 
It is unsatisfactory to describe or explain trade contestation against TTIP without looking at 
what came before, a finding that other authors have picked up as well. Walter (2001) argues 
that “it is difficult to understand NGO opposition to the Millennium Round agenda in Seattle 
in 1999 without addressing their opposition to and mobilization against the MAI.” (p. 52). Von 
Bülow (2010) also puts a particular emphasis on the social context, meaning the coalitions 
(nationally and transnationally) that anti-trade groups have gotten into, to explain their 
organizational and ideational choices.  
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The core transnational group that has been working on trade issues over the last 15 years is 
the Seattle 2 Brussels Network, established in the aftermath of the protests in Seattle, 1999. De 
Ville & Siles-Brügge have called this a transnational advocacy network (TAN): networks of 
activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating 
their formation (Keck & Sikkink, 1999)38. The majority of members represent the categories of 
organizations that have historically worked on trade issues: environmental and North-South 
organizations (trade unions are the third pillar; interview 1). “The key people in S2B have been 
working on trade for 20-30 years, so they are in touch with pretty much every trade 
campaigner.” (interview 2). Some big members of S2B took it upon them to immediately 
organize some form of European coordination, with meetings, trainings and organization on 
Member State level. “They were the ones conveying this big strategy that made the movement 
European from the start.”  (interview 2). 
Many organizations have furthermore (re-)joined these “traditional” trade campaigners very 
quickly. Several organizations had been campaigning on trade before, and thus had already 
developed network linkages with the core group, but had left for the climate debate. “Many 
people I see at the CSDs on TTIP, I know them. They got back to trade, after they worked on these issues 
in the past, but were now dealing more with natural resources or climate” (interview 1). Besides 
those, a lot of new organizations also joined, such as consumer, patient or health organizations. 
Also several movements that do not have trade as their core business such as movements 
against GMOs, or anti-austerity groups. It can be hypothesized that these groups, as they 
constitute the same civil society space as those others, were already linked to other groups and 
were therefore informed and engaged quickly. Network analysis of these pre-existing and 
emerging coalitions could give more information of the most important linkages before, both 
on a pan-European or national scale.  
Secondly, there was an enormous amount of expertise and discourses ready-available. As 
stated in the previous part, criticism on trade deals is not new, so many organizations had 
already developed an analysis and critique of EU trade, which they saw reflected and 
aggravated in TTIP. More importantly, the most toxic element of the deal, ISDS or investment 
protection, was an issue that had been studied and criticized by a core group of people years 
before TTIP was launched. Three moments had triggered a surge of resistance and expertise-
building against including far-reaching investment protection provisions in trade agreements: 
the MAI (1995-1998), the possibility of including investment in the WTO at Cancun (2003) and 
the transfer of competences on investment protection to the EU after the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
The same groups at the forefront of ISDS criticism now, were those people that campaigned 
against it 15-20 years ago (interview 4). As a result: “The moment TTIP took off in 2013, all the 
material, the discourse, everything on investment and ISDS was ready.” (interview 1). The discourse 
on ISDS has put the Commission on the defensive from day one, a situation they have to date 
                                                          
38 It is arguably increasingly difficult to speak of a ‘TAN’, as their definitional goal would not be mass 
mobilization, but changing the discursive frames of the debate. The latter is obviously true, but the fact 
that we have seen extremely large mobilizations throughout Europe – and specifically in Germany – is 
hinting towards more than just a loose coalition.  
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not fully recovered from, and prompted them to change their approach on investment 
protection in September 2015 (European Commission, 2015).  
Expertise is not confined to ISDS. Many different groups that were working on separate topics, 
such as German NGOs on REACH or rural organizations on GMOs, have a vast pool of 
expertise on their specific topics (interview 2). These issues are now all included in a trade 
dynamic, which necessitates their involvement and adds detailed and quality knowledge to 
the debate. A representative from a Belgian consumer organizations (new to the trade debate) 
said, for example, that they have been working for years on issues such as GMOs, or 
chemically rinsed beef or chicken and that it has been fairly easy, or at least manageable, to 
keep these topics off the table through normal legislative lobbying. These topics are now all 
included in a trade negotiation through the regulatory chapter, which necessitates their 
involvement in EU trade policy (interview 3). 
(Non-)trade coalitions or sharing expertise is of course facilitated through the use of internet 
and media. Smythe & Smith (2006) state that the ICT revolution has made it much easier for 
NGOs to establish and sustain activist networks, share information and build campaigns. The 
frames and discourses that were ready, were quickly disseminated through (mainly) online 
social media (Bauer, 2015) and caught on surprisingly well with the public (Eliasson, 2015). 
The resulting upsurge of citizens becoming aware of TTIP, has pushed even more groups to 
campaign on the issue, the same dynamic seen during the ACTA negotiations (Dür & Mateo, 
2014). All these things have facilitated the outburst of mobilization against TTIP, or as Von 
Bülow (2010, p. 199) stated: “Coalition building seemed to yield better results in terms of 
sustainability when actors were able to adapt preexisting social networks, repertoires, and 
resources to deal with new challenges.” These pre-existing mobilization resources, combined 
with the particular POS that (the time of) TTIP represents, can include a fair share of the 
mobilization/politicization spike.  
6 – Conclusion 
The politicization of TTIP, manifested as mobilization by civil society organizations and 
citizens, needs a broader understanding and explanation than singular statements. In this 
paper I have used insights from the politicization literature to discern a longer-term trend in 
the politicization of EU trade policy, and the spike of mobilization against TTIP. As trade has 
an increasingly large political authority, the political activities towards this part of the EU will 
increase. The legitimacy requirements coupled to this authority are equally high (especially 
given the far-reaching impact regulatory cooperation would have), and to the extent that 
organizations and citizens do not perceive output nor throughput legitimacy as satisfactory, 
this has resulted in increased resistance or protest (through political activities) towards EU 
trade policy. Pitted against this longer term trend, TTIP is an extension and intensification of 
the same elements: a possibly infinite political authority increase to a (symbolic) Trans-Atlantic 
level, which triggers the same legitimacy concerns. Adding to this story, and accounting for 
the particular spike in attention and mobilization given to TTIP are the perceptions and actions 
of interest groups and CSOs. They have witnessed a particular political opportunity structure 
that, combined with pre-existing mobilization resources, facilitated their mobilization. Seen on 
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this longer time frame, TTIP was therefore only the adding of fuel to flames that were already 
burning for some time, be it a bit under the radar.  
Several directions of further research can be provided, as this is only an explorative attempt at 
constructing a theoretical framework of trade politicization. There should be, firstly, more 
detailed time series data on trade mobilization that can make the dependent variable more 
qualified and measurable. Secondly, there should be more elaboration on how political 
opportunity structures and mobilization resources interact, and specifically which variables 
were the decisive factors in this story. This points attention towards the literature on social 
movement building, but also necessitates more interviews with representatives of CSOs. 
Thirdly, the explanatory framework used could be adapted to explain differentiated 
politicization across Member States. As De Wilde et al. (2015, p. 15) have claimed: “differentiated 
forms, degrees and manifestations (…) depend on the time, setting and location in which it unfolds”. 
Several authors have already taken up this task of explaining cross-national differences, but 
with a conception of politicization linked to public debates in mind. (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). 
The theoretical insights from these could be transformed into a mobilization perspective, that 
can account for the question: “why is TTIP more politicized in some countries (notably 
Germany and Austria) than in others?” Fourthly, more research is needed on the consequences 
of this politicization, in terms of its impact on polity (transparency regimes, participation rules, 
the role of national parliaments), politics (who holds power in politicized debates?) and policy. 
We can also not neglect the more normative questions surrounding this debate: does the 
politicization of TTIP (and trade) also lead to a democratization of trade on EU level? Is this 
process (or product) inherently a good thing? These are only some of the questions and 
interesting directions further research can lead to. The politicization literature can provide lots 
of insights to this trade debate (and vice versa), and this paper is only one starting point of 
making this link.  
Interviews 
Interview 1 – Marc Maes, Policy Officer Trade & Food – 11.11.11-CNCD 
Interview 2 – Lucile Falgueyrac, Coordinator Seattle 2 Brussels Network 
Interview 3 – Joost Vandenbroucke, Head European Policy and Advocacy Test-Aankoop 
Belgium (consumer organization) 
Interview 4 – Cecilia Olivet, Researcher at Transnational Institute Netherlands 
Interview 5 – Jean-Pierre Descan, Policy Officer Europe Christelijke Mutaliteit Belgium (patient 
organization) 
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